Andrew Rose | Clausen Center

Andrew Rose

Bernard T. Rocca, Jr. Chair in International Business & Trade

Economic Analysis and Policy Group, Haas School of Business

Andrew Rose is the Bernard T. Rocca, Jr. Chair in International Business & Trade and serves as Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the Haas School of Business. He is also a Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (based in Cambridge, MA), and a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (based in London, England). His research addresses issues in international trade, finance, and macroeconomics. He interested in the theory and practice of economic policy, and most of his work is applied and driven by real world international phenomena. He has worked on five continents and at a number of international economic agencies and national agencies in five continents.

Summary of recent papers:

Why do Estimates of the EMU Effect on Trade Vary So Much?

Date: July 2016


Citation: Working Paper, Preliminary

Larger data sets, with more countries and a longer span of time, exhibit systematically larger effects of European monetary union on trade.  I establish this stylized fact with meta‐analysis and confirm it by estimating a plain‐vanilla gravity model.  I then explain this finding by examining systematic biases in “multilateral resistance to trade” manifest in time‐varying country fixed effects; bias grows as the sample is truncated by dropping small poor countries.


Political Borders and Bank Lending in Post-Crisis America

Date: May 2016

Coauthors: Matthieu Chavaz

Citation: Working Paper, Preliminary

We study the role of constituency borders for credit allocation by banks that received public capital injections from the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in the 2008‐09 financial crisis.  We use a difference‐in‐difference‐in‐difference approach, estimating the impact of the TARP on lending in census tracts contiguous to congressional district borders.  To account for reverse causality, we use instrumental variables based on pre‐existing political connections. We find that mortgage lending by recipients of public capital injections during the 2008 crisis increased by 15 to 37% for census tracts inside their home‐representative’s congressional district, compared with those immediately outside the congressional district.  The impact is stronger if the representative supported the TARP in Congress, was subsequently re‐elected, and was re‐elected by a small margin.  Together, these results suggest that political borders which should be economically irrelevant actually matter for investment if public interventions create a link between firms and elected officials.