Willis H. Booth Chair in Banking and Finance
Economic Analysis and Policy Group, Haas School of Business
Ross Levine is the Willis H. Booth Chair in Banking and Finance at the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. He is Senior Fellow at the Milken Institute, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research (Cambridge, Massachusetts); Professor Levine’s work focuses on financial regulation and economic growth, income inequality, and poverty; financial crises; the political economy of financial regulation; international capital flows; and the returns to entrepreneurship and the qualities of entrepreneurs.
Summary of recent papers:
Date: April 2016
Coauthors: Chen Lin, Wensi Xie
Citation: NBER Working Papers, No. 22153
Are firms more resilient to systemic banking crises in economies with higher levels of social trust? Using firm-level data in 34 countries from 1990 through 2011, we find that liquidity-dependent firms in high-trust countries obtain more trade credit and suffer smaller drops in profits and employment during banking crises than similar firms in low-trust economies. The results are consistent with the view that when banking crises block the normal banking-lending channel, greater social trust facilitates access to informal finance, cushioning the effects of these crises on corporate profits and employment.
Date: April 2016
Coauthors: Liangliang Jiang, Chen Lin
Citation: NBER Working Papers, No. 22195
Does an intensification of competition among banks increase or decrease liquidity creation? By integrating the dynamic process of interstate bank deregulation that lowered barriers to competition across U.S. states over the 1980s and 1990s with the gravity model of the geographic expansion of banks, we construct time-varying measures of the competitive pressures facing each individual bank. We find that regulatory-induced competition reduced liquidity creation. Consistent with some theories, we also find that the liquidity-destroying effects of competition are mitigated among more profitable banks and heightened among smaller banks.