

# The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty

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Federal Reserve Board

*Macroeconomic Implications of Trade Policies and Trade Shocks*

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
# The End of Free Trade?

Countries around the world are reconsidering international trade arrangements.

- Brexit
- From NAFTA to USMCA
- U.S. vs China trade policy actions and negotiations
- U.S. vs E.U. trade negotiations

*What are the effects of the increased uncertainty associated with these trade policy developments?*

# The End of Free Trade?



# Three Questions About Trade Policy Uncertainty

1. **Measurement:** How to measure trade policy uncertainty (TPU)?
2. **Quantification:** What are the macroeconomic effects of increased TPU?
3. **Transmission:** How does TPU affect the economy?

# Our Contribution

1. **Measurement:** We construct 3 TPU measures based on firm-level and aggregate data.
2. **Quantification:** Increase in TPU reduced (U.S.) investment by about 2 percent and output by 1 percent.
3. **Transmission:** TPU reduces activity through anticipation effects (expectation of higher future tariffs) and uncertainty effects (higher dispersion of future tariffs).

# Firm-Level TPU

## Measuring Firm-Level TPU: Textual Analysis

We construct firm-level measures of TPU from earning call transcripts for publicly listed companies (see also [Hassan et al., 2017](#)).

- Our sample: 160,000 transcripts, 7,500 firms, 2005Q1-2018Q4.

We proceed in two steps:

1. Search the earning call transcripts for trade policy (*TP*) terms
  - ▶ E.g., *tariff\**, *import dut\**, *import barrier\**, *trade polic\**
2. Search for uncertainty (*U*) terms within **10** words to *TP* terms
  - ▶ E.g., *risk\**, *threat\**, *tension\**, *uncertain\**

*TPU* = Number of joint instances of *TP* and Uncertainty (normalized by number of words in the call)

## Examples of *TP* and *TPU*

TP:

### Goodyear Tire & Rubber - 2013Q3

- “You will note for the fourth quarter, however, that North America will be down year over year, again reflecting the aberration of a year ago, when fourth-quarter dealer orders for low-end tires were high post expiration of Chinese tire [tariffs](#).”





TPU:

### Levi & Strauss Co. - 2018Q1

- “The biggest uncertainty I think we’re facing. There are really two, and I don’t know if I want to rank them, but one is the [uncertainty](#) around trade and [tariffs](#). That could have significant short-term impact.”



# Variation Across Industries and Time



Note: Share of firms in the industry mentioning TPU in their earnings calls

# Quantifying the Effects of Firm-Level TPU on Investment

- We use Compustat balance-sheet data over 2015Q1-2018Q4
- (Cumulative) Investment  $I_{i,t+h}$  constructed from fixed assets  $k_{i,t}$  as:


$$I_{i,t+h} = \log k_{i,t+h} - \log k_{i,t-1}, \text{ where } h = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4$$

- Following Jorda (2005), we estimate:

$$I_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i + \alpha_t + \beta_h TPU_{i,t} + \Gamma' X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

- $\alpha_i$  and  $\alpha_t$ : firm and time fixed effects
- $X_{i,t}$ : Tobin's q, cash-flow, openness, lagged  $I$ , lagged  $TPU$
- $\beta_h$ : response of  $\log k$  in  $t+h$  to change in TPU in quarter  $t$
- We restrict sample to firms in manufacturing, agriculture and mining





# Firm-Level Response to High TPU



Cumulative response of log fixed assets after increase in *TPU*

Cross-Section in 2018

# Local Projections: Robustness



## Aggregation of Firm-Level Estimates

- Our estimates imply that the 2018 increase in TPU reduced U.S. investment by 1 percent through direct firm-level effects:

$$\underbrace{-2.1\%}_{\text{effect on K of firm hit in 2018}} \times \underbrace{10.4\%}_{\text{share of firms hit by high TPU in 2018}} \times \underbrace{43\%}_{\text{asset share of mfg. firms}} \times \underbrace{\$24 \text{ tn}}_{\text{stock of US fixed assets in 2018}} \div \underbrace{\$2.8 \text{ tn}}_{\text{US investment in 2018}} \simeq \underbrace{-1\%}_{\text{decline in private NR investment}}$$

- Caveat: Calculation ignores indirect effects through general equilibrium channels
  - ▶ E.g. Uncertainty reduces aggregate demand via precautionary motives.
  - ▶ Limiting case: All firms are equally worried. No cross-sectional differential response, but large aggregate response.


# Aggregate TPU

# Measuring Aggregate TPU

## 1. News-Based Using Textual Analysis ([Baker et al., 2016](#))

- We search for TPU words in newspaper articles
- Hence, this index captures TPU as perceived by press


# News-Based TPU



Index=100 when share of articles mentioning *TPU* is 1 percent



# News-Based vs. Earnings Calls Based TPU



# Measuring Aggregate TPU

## 1. News-Based Using Textual Analysis ([Baker et al., 2016](#))

- We search for TPU words in newspaper articles
- Hence, this index captures TPU as perceived by press

## 2. Stochastic Volatility Using Tariff Data ([Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2015](#))


- We estimate the process:

$$\tau_t = (1 - \rho_\tau) \mu_\tau + \rho_\tau \tau_{t-1} + \exp(\sigma_t) \varepsilon_t, \quad \varepsilon_t \sim N(0, 1)$$

$$\sigma_t = (1 - \rho_\sigma) \sigma + \rho_\sigma \sigma_{t-1} + \eta u_t, \quad u_t \sim N(0, 1)$$

- $u_t$  affects spread of values for tariffs (i.e. tariff volatility shock)

# Tariff Volatility TPU



Filtered series of tariff volatility. Shaded area: 68-percent credible sets.


Comparison with news-based TPU

# Quantifying the Effects of Aggregate TPU


- Estimation of VAR using quarterly data for the United States
- Baseline bivariate specification and ordering:
  1. News-Based TPU
  2. Real business fixed investment per capita
- Alternative specifications (see paper):
  - ▶ Tariff volatility TPU
  - ▶ Medium-scale VAR: tariff rate, real GDP per capita, JLN uncertainty, exchange rate, tax rate on capital income.
- Sample: 1960Q1-2018Q4
- Consider IRFs to 2-standard deviation shock

# Aggregate Effects: Baseline VAR

### News-Based TPU Index



### Private Investment



SV TPU




Larger VAR

# Quantifying the Effects of Aggregate TPU, Take Two

- Estimation of a global VAR using monthly data
- Baseline specification and ordering:
  1. News-Based TPU
  2. U.S., AFE, and EME industrial production
  3. Broad real dollar
  4. World imports
  5. U.S. stock prices and credit spreads
  6. U.S. import tariffs
- Sample: 1985M1-2019M5

# Quantifying the Effects of Aggregate TPU, Take Two

- 2018 increase in TPU (1st wave) reduced global output by 0.8 percent
- 2019H1 increase in TPU (2nd wave) reduced global output by an additional 0.3 percent



— Total Effect  
 - - - Effect of 1st wave only

## Taking Stock of the Empirical Evidence

- 2018 Increase in TPU and Investment:
  - Firm level (direct exposure):  $\simeq$  1 percent decline in aggregate U.S. fixed investment.
  - Aggregate VAR (direct + indirect effect):  $\simeq$  2 percent decline in U.S. investment.
  
- 2018 Increase in TPU and Output:
  - $\simeq$  1 percent decline in world output. About \$850 bn.
  
- Small or large?



# Taking Stock of the Empirical Evidence

NYT, October 8, 2019: *"Trade war could put Swiss-size dent in global economy - IMF warns."*



# TPU Transmission:DSGE Model

# Framework

- Medium-scale DSGE model featuring:
  - ▶ Two countries specializing in production of traded intermediate inputs
  - ▶ Armington CES aggregator for traded intermediate inputs
  - ▶ Sticky prices and wages, Taylor rule
  - ▶ Investment adjustment costs
  - ▶ Firm participation in export market subject to fixed cost (as in [Alessandria and Choi, 2007](#))
- Goal: Trace out aggregate and firm-level effects of the 2018 increase in TPU.
- Assumption: Full retaliation of any trade policy action.

# Effects of Tariffs

- Tariffs increase the relative price of imported goods → consumers switch towards domestic varieties **Demand switching**
- Tariffs induce supply-side distortions: They act like taxes on capital (K) and labor (L) **Supply Distortion**
- Tariffs reduce the value of exporting → mass of exporters shrinks and aggregate productivity declines **Entry Distortion**

## Experiment: An Increase in TPU


- We isolate two effects of an increase in TPU
  - ▶ Rise in expected tariffs (first moment)
  - ▶ (Mean-preserving) increase in the dispersion of future tariffs (second moment)
- Tariffs follow the estimated SV process:

$$\tau_t^m = (1 - \rho_\tau) \mu_\tau + \rho_\tau \tau_{t-1}^m + \exp(\sigma_{t-1}^m) \varepsilon_t^\tau + \varepsilon_{t-1}^N \quad (1)$$

$$\sigma_t^m = (1 - \rho_{\sigma^m}) \sigma^m + \rho_{\sigma^m} \sigma_{t-1}^m + \eta u_t \quad (2)$$

- Scenario: Agents learn that tariffs can increase from  $\tau^{SS} = 0.02$  to  $\tau^{HIGH} = 0.08$  with probability 0.5 (but no actual tariff change materializes). Tariff Rates

# Model Experiment: Results



# TPU: Channels of Transmission

- **Tariff news:**

- ▶ Higher future import prices lower expected profits and wages, depressing aggregate demand (despite intertemporal substitution incentive).
- ▶ Given costly price adjustments, markups increase (input costs may be higher in the future), further reducing hours worked and consumption.
  - Sticky prices are key for amplification and for comovement.
  - With flex prices, fall in output is smaller as investment declines but consumption initially increases
- ▶ Smaller expected export market reduces trade, with exporters reducing capital relatively more.

- **Robustness:** News Effects

# TPU: Channels of Transmission

- **Tariff uncertainty:**
  - ▶ Higher uncertainty increases savings and reduces consumption (precautionary motive).
  - ▶ Given costly price adjustments, markups increase (as in [Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2015](#)), reducing hours worked and consumption.
    - With flex prices, agents self-insure by accumulating capital.
  - ▶ Trade declines, with exporters reducing capital more.
    - Differently from [Handley and Limão, 2017](#), export participation increases despite fixed export costs.
    - Key intuition: Differential capital stock adds a margin of adjustment.
- Robustness: **Uncertainty Effects**



## Taking Stock of the Model Results

- 2018 increase in TPU lowers U.S. investment by 1.5 percent and GDP by nearly 1 percent
  - ▶ Model reproduces both firm-level and aggregate evidence.
  - ▶ Anticipation of higher tariffs accounts for 2/3 of these declines, while uncertainty about tariffs for the remaining 1/3 .
- Higher TPU reduces aggregate demand and trade.
  - ▶ Sticky prices (and markup response) are key for transmission.

# Conclusions

- **Measurement:** We construct 3 measures of TPU using both firm-level and aggregate macroeconomic data.
- **Quantification:** We provide empirical evidence that the recent increase in TPU may have reduced investment by 2 percent and global output by about 1 percent.
- **Transmission:** Higher TPU reduces activity through changes in expected tariffs (first moment effect) and in volatility of future tariffs (second moment effect).


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
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2. "*Does Trade Policy Uncertainty Affect Global Economic Activity?*", FEDS Notes, September 4, 2019.


# Cross-Section: 2018 vs.2017 Investment Growth




# News-Based TPU vs Baker et al. (2016) TPU



# TPU from Hassan et al. (2016)




# US vs. Foreign Firms TPU





# News-Based vs. Tariff Volatility TPU



## Correlation of tariff volatility with other shocks

<i>External Shocks</i>	Correlation	(p-value)	Granger F-test	(p-value)
Oil shocks <sup>a</sup>	-0.08	(0.45)	0.65	(0.52)
Monetary policy shocks <sup>b</sup>	-0.05	(0.70)	0.78	(0.46)
TFP growth shocks <sup>c</sup>	-0.01	(0.91)	0.07	(0.94)
Unanticipated tax shocks <sup>d</sup>	-0.00	(0.99)	0.19	(0.83)
Defense spending shocks <sup>e</sup>	0.06	(0.53)	0.95	(0.39)
Capital tax vol. shocks <sup>f</sup>	0.14	(0.28)	1.04	(0.36)

NOTE: The entries in the table denote the pairwise correlations and Granger-causality tests between the tariff volatility shock identified under the baseline VAR specification and a set of external instruments. The regressions underlying the pairwise Granger causality tests include a constant and two lags of each external instrument. Sample period for the volatility shocks is 1960:Q3 to 1984:Q4.

<sup>a</sup> Crude oil supply shock from [Hamilton \(2003\)](#).

<sup>b</sup> Monetary policy shocks from [Romer and Romer \(2004\)](#); (1969:Q1–1984:Q4).





<sup>c</sup> Residuals from a first-order autoregressive model of the log-difference in the utilization-adjusted total factor productivity; see [Fernald \(2012\)](#).

<sup>d</sup> Unanticipated tax shocks from [Mertens and Ravn \(2011\)](#).

<sup>e</sup> Defense spending news shocks from [Ramey \(2011\)](#).

<sup>f</sup> Capital tax volatility shocks from [Fernandez-Villaverde et al. \(2015\)](#).

# Variation Across Industries and Time



Note: Share of firms in the industry mentioning TPU in their earnings calls

# Topics List in Earnings Calls

## Topics 2005-2009



## Topics 2010-2014



## Topics 2015-2017







## Topics 2018



Note: LDA Analysis on Transcripts from All Years. Most Common Bigrams, Grouped by Topic.

# VAR with News-Based TPU: 1960-2018



## Examples of *TP* and *TPU*

TP:

### Goodyear Tire & Rubber - 2013Q3


- “You will note for the fourth quarter, however, that North America will be down year over year, again reflecting the aberration of a year ago, when fourth-quarter dealer orders for low-end tires were high post expiration of Chinese tire [tariffs](#).”

TPU:

### Levi & Strauss Co. - 2018Q1

- “The biggest uncertainty I think we’re facing. There are really two, and I don’t know if I want to rank them, but one is the [uncertainty](#) around trade and [tariffs](#). That could have significant short-term impact.”

# Measuring Firm-Level TPU: Variation Across Firms and Time



Note: TPU for selected firms.

# Effects of Tariffs: Demand-Switching

[Back](#)

- Tariffs increase the relative price of imported goods → consumers switch towards domestic varieties

$$m_t = -\theta \times (p_{m,t} + \tau_t^m) + a_t$$

imports                      trade elasticity                      price of imports                      domestic absorption

- This effect tends to boost domestic output but
  - ▶ Symmetric retaliation abroad reduces foreign demand
  - ▶ Supply-side distortions reduce domestic production



## Effects of Tariffs: Supply-Side Distortions

Back

- Price of consumption bundle is  $P \left( P_D, P_M, \tau_t^m \right)$
- Tariffs tax revenues by reducing relative price of domestic good

$$PROFITS = \frac{P_D}{P \left( P_D, P_M, \tau_t^m \right)} Y - r^k K - wL$$

- Tariffs are akin to a uniform increase in taxes on K and L

$$PROFITS = \frac{P_D}{P \left( P_D, P_M, 0 \right)} Y - r^k \left( 1 + \tau^k \right) K - w \left( 1 + \tau^L \right) L$$

→ Contractionary effect on investment and output

# Effects of Tariffs: Firm Entry

Back


- Firm exports at  $t$  if productivity is above threshold  $z_m^*$

$$\underbrace{p^k \Delta k}_{\text{extra investment}} + \underbrace{W_t c_m}_{\text{fixed cost}} = \underbrace{z_m^{*\gamma}}_{\text{threshold}} \underbrace{\pi(W_t, K_{mt})}_{\text{unit profit}} \underbrace{(\Gamma_{\text{exp}}^v - \Gamma_{\text{no exp}}^v)}_{\text{market size gain}} + \underbrace{E \Delta V}_{\text{gain in contin. value}}$$

where  $m \in \{ \text{Exporter at } t-1, \text{ Non Exporter at } t-1 \}$


- Gain in market size  $(\Gamma_{\text{exp}}^v - \Gamma_{\text{no exp}}^v)$  shrinks because of demand switching at home and abroad
- Thresholds  $z_m^*$  declines and so Entry declines and Exit increases
- Aggregate productivity declines as cross-sectional correlation between output and idiosyncratic productivity declines

# Tariff News: Robustness



Back

# Tariff Uncertainty: Robustness



## Experiment: Calibration of the Shocks

1. Time 0: Agents learn that there is probability  $p_0 = \frac{1}{2}$  that tariffs increase from  $\tau^{SS} = 0.02$  to  $\tau^{HIGH} = 0.08$  Tariff Rates

$$\varepsilon_0^N = p_0 \cdot 0.08 + (1 - p_0) \cdot 0.02 = 0.03$$



$$\sigma_0^m = \sigma^m(p_0) = \log(0.03)$$

where  $\sigma^m(p)$  satisfies  $\exp(\sigma^m) = \Delta\tau^m \sqrt{p(1-p)}$

2. From  $t = 1, \dots, T$  **no change in tariffs occurs** i.e.  $\tau_t^m = \tau^{SS}$  but **uncertainty about tariffs persists:**

- ▶ As agents observe no increase in tariffs they update  $p_t$  so that  $\sigma^m(p_t) = \sigma_t^m$  follows SV law of motion (2)
- ▶ Expectation of tariffs adjust accordingly:  $\varepsilon_t^N = p_t \cdot 0.08 + (1 - p_t) \cdot 0.02$


# Aggregate Effects: Stochastic Volatility TPU

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# Uncertainty: Channels of Transmission



1. Higher uncertainty reduces aggregate demand (precautionary motive).
2. Markups increase (as in [Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2015](#)).

- Uncertainty about tariffs increases the variance of future desired prices.
- When different varieties are substitutes, profit function is asymmetric  $\rightarrow$  losses from overpricing smaller than losses from underpricing.



- Producers raise prices to avoid being stuck with relatively low price in the future  $\rightarrow$  markups rise, especially in foreign market.

# Aggregate Effects: Additional Controls




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


# Quantifying the Effects of Aggregate TPU, Take Two


1. U.S. Industrial Production




2. AFE Industrial Production




3. EME Industrial Production



4. Broad Real Dollar Index



5. World Imports



6. S&P 500

