Estimating Sector-Level Economies of Scale

Estimating Sector-Level Economies of Scale

By Andres Rodriguez-Clare, UC Berkeley, Dominick  Bartelme, University of Michigan,  Arnaud Costinot, MIT, and Dave Donaldson, Stanford University

                 For a preliminary version of the paper, see here.

Sector-level economies of scale matter for economic development, industrial policy, and the consequences of trade liberalization. As of yet, however, the literature has not converged on a definitive answer regarding their existence and even less an estimate of their magnitude and variation across sectors. For example, most quantitative trade papers explicitly or implicitly assume that the sector-level scale elasticity is either zero or equal to the inverse of the trade elasticity. This paper develops a two-step strategy for estimating sector-level scale elasticities using bilateral trade data. First, a revealed preference approach is used to compute the productivity of each sector-country cell from observed bilateral trade flows. Second, a market access approach is used to construct demand shifters that vary across sector-country cells. The scale elasticity (a supply side parameter) is recovered from a regression of productivity on sector size using the constructed demand shifters as instrumental variables. Prelim- inary results suggest that economies of scale are positive but not as large as those implicitly imposed in many leading quantitative trade models.

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Topics

Development

Initiatives

International Trade & Development

The effects of joining Multinational Supply Chains: New Evidence from Firm-to-Firm Linkages

The effects of joining Multinational Supply Chains: New Evidence from Firm-to-Firm Linkages

by Isabela Manelici and Jose-P. Vasquez (UC Berkeley), with Alonso Alfaro-Urena (Banco Central de Costa Rica)

See here for a draft of the paper.

Using administrative data tracking all firm-to-firm transactions in Costa Rica, we investigate the effects of becoming a supplier to multinational corporations (MNCs). Event-study estimates reveal that after starting to supply MNCs domestic firms experience strong and persistent improvements in firm performance, including gains of 6-9% in revenue-based measures of total factor productivity (TFPR) four years after. Moreover, their business with buyers other than the first MNC buyer grows by 20%. This growth is due to both higher average sales and having more buyers. To interpret these changes in business with others, we propose a simple theoretical framework. When we do not account for the extensive margin of new buyers, we estimate gains in the productivity residual similar to TFPR estimates. Around half of these gains are due to an improved ability to match with new buyers. Finally, we survey domestic firms and MNCs for additional insight. We learn that becoming suppliers to MNCs is transformative for domestic firms, with changes ranging from new managerial practices to better reputation. These changes arise from interactions during which MNCs communicate their expectations and advice on how to meet them, and from the efforts of new suppliers to rise up to the challenge.

Topics

Development

Initiatives

International Trade & Development

Nobel Laureate Jean Tirole Lecture

Nobel Laureate Jean Tirole Lecture

Jean Tirole, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics will give the Joan and Egon von Kaschnitz Lecture this Spring. The public Lecture will be based on Professor Tirole’s book “Economics for the Common Good”
The lecture is sponsored by the Clausen Center and the Gilbert Center.

Type

Conferences

Location

Spieker Forum in Chou Hall, Berkeley-Haas

Date & Time

Apr 30, 2018

Website

none

Cost Of Democracy: Political Finance In India

Cost Of Democracy: Political Finance In India

A talk by political economist, Dr. Milan Vaishnav on his new book When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics, the first thorough study of the co-existence of crime and democratic processes in Indian politics.

In India, the world’s largest democracy, the symbiotic relationship between crime and politics raises complex questions. For instance, how can free and fair democratic processes exist alongside rampant criminality? Why do political parties recruit candidates with reputations for wrongdoing? Why are one-third of state and national legislators elected—and often re-elected—in spite of criminal charges pending against them? In this eye-opening study, political scientist Milan Vaishnav mines a rich array of sources, including fieldwork on political campaigns and interviews with candidates, party workers, and voters, large surveys, and an original database on politicians’ backgrounds to offer the first comprehensive study of an issue that has implications for the study of democracy both within and beyond India’s borders. More on the book 

Milan Vaishnav is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. His primary research focus is the political economy of India. He was previously a fellow at the Center for Global Development and has taught at Columbia, George Washington, and Georgetown Universities. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. Read more about Dr. Vaishnav 

Type

Conferences

Location

Stephens Hall, 10 (ISAS Conf. Room)

Date & Time

Apr 17, 2018

Website

https://iis.berkeley.edu/events/cost-of-democracy-political-finance-in-india