Firm Dynamics and Cities

Firm Dynamics and Cities

by David Sraer & Cecile Gaubert

On average, firms are more productive in larger cities. The typical interpretation of this finding relies on a combination of a selection effect and agglomeration externalities. Empirically, these explanations have been tested in the context of static models (Combes et al. (2012)). This project will dig further into the question of the productivity advantage of large cities by considering the dynamics of firm productivity across cities. The selection effect documented in the literature can materialize both at firm entry (more productive entrepreneurs decide to start firms in larger cities) as well at firm exit (exiting firms have larger productivity in larger cities). Agglomeration externalities can affect the level of firm productivity, as is standard in the literature, but can also affect firm growth. This project builds on a very unique dataset, which consists of the exhaustive firm registry in France that records the location, industry and number of employee at creation of all firms registered in France between 1987 and 2007. The analysis will also rely on a model of firms entry, exit and dynamics a la Hopenhayn (1992), that includes agglomeration externalities, local labor markets as well as local competition for firms operating in the non-tradable sector. The model will highlight how agglomeration economies and firm selection shape the productivity distribution of firms operating in different cities, and in particular should help us derive an estimation strategy to recover the different parameters governing the model, such as the agglomeration externality parameter, the local demand parameters.
The hope is for this project to allow for a better understanding of agglomeration externalities, and in particular how they interact with firm dynamics. This is a novel aspect of this well-studied question. Beyond agglomeration externalities, decomposing more precisely where the productivity advantage of large cities is coming from is important from an urban policy perspective. The optimal design of public transfers to firms located in different cities may well depend on firm age, if cities affect firms differently at different point in their life-cycle. Addressing these questions is the purpose of this research project.

Topics

Development

Initiatives

International Trade & Development

Do Antitakeover Laws Affect Technological Change? International Evidence

Do Antitakeover Laws Affect Technological Change? International Evidence

by Ross Levine

Does removing impediments to corporate takeovers spur, slow, or have no effect on technological innovation? This research will provide the first international evaluation of whether and how antitakeover laws affect innovation. The research will use data on changes in laws governing corporate takeovers over the period from 1976 through 2006 for 97 countries. The research will use data on patents and citations to those patents to measure innovation. Preliminary results suggest that reducing legal and regulatory barriers to takeovers accelerates innovation.

Topics

Capital flows

Initiatives

Financial Globalization

Managing Sudden Stops: Analytical Issues and Empirical Extensions

Managing Sudden Stops: Analytical Issues and Empirical Extensions

by Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta

To access full paper, see here.

Sudden stops are when capital inflows dry up abruptly.  The banker’s aphorism – “it’s not speed that kills but the sudden stop” – has been popularly invoked since at least the Mexican crisis in 1994.  Awareness then rose with impetus from the Argentine crisis (1995), the Asian crisis (1997), the Russian crisis (1998), and the Brazilian crisis (1999).  Google’s Ngram Viewer shows a sharp increase after 2000 in references to the phrase.

The question is whether this increase reflects the growing incidence of the problem or simply the growing currency of the term.  The gradual diffusion of scholarly terminology suggests that the observed trend may simply reflect the latter.  At the same time, however, there is heightened awareness in the policy community of capital-flow volatility and reversals as reflected in the decision of the International Monetary Fund to adopt a new, more sympathetic view of capital controls and international capital market interventions generally (IMF 2012), indicative perhaps of a growing problem.  Episodes like the “taper tantrum” in 2013, when talk that the Federal Reserve might taper its purchases of securities, leading emerging-market currencies to crash, and the “normalization” episode in 2015, when expectations that the Fed would soon start raising U.S. interest rates, leading to an outflow of funds from emerging markets, suggest that sudden stops may in fact be growing more frequent or, perhaps, more disruptive.

In this paper we extend previous analyses of sudden stops, contrasting their incidence and severity before and after 2002, the end of the period covered by most of the classic contributions to the literature.   Our central contributions are two.  First, we update those earlier classic contributions, highlighting what if anything has changed in the decade or so since their initial publication. Second, we analyze the policy response, asking whether that response has evolved over time and, specifically, whether there is evidence of central banks and governments in emerging markets responding in ways that promise to better stabilize output, employment and, not least, domestic financial markets.

We show that the frequency and duration of sudden stops in emerging markets have remained largely unchanged since 2002.  Casual impression gleaned from the tapering episode in 2013 might suggest otherwise.  But excitable press coverage notwithstanding, we find that interruptions to capital flows during the Fed’s discussion and implementation of its policy of “tapering” security purchases were milder than the sudden stops of prior years. These episodes were shorter, entailed smaller reversals, and had a milder impact on financial and real variables.   One might call them “sudden pauses” rather than “sudden stops.”

At the same time, global factors appear to have become more important for the incidence of sudden stops.  Similarly, when we consider a measure of contagion or concurrence such as the number of sudden stops occurring simultaneously in other countries, we find that it is sudden stops globally that matter after 2002, whereas in the preceding period it had been sudden stops in the same region as the country in question that had the most statistical power.  Again, we are inclined to interpret this in terms of the growing importance of global factors.

See poster.

Topics

Capital flows

Initiatives

Financial Globalization

Banking the Unbanked: A field experiment in Prize-linked Savings in Mexico

Banking the Unbanked: A field experiment in Prize-linked Savings in Mexico

by Aisling Scott , Paul Gertler (Berkeley-Haas) and Enrique Seira (ITAM)

For a draft of the paper, see here.

This study randomized a temporary incentive of prize-linked savings (PLS) across bank branches in Mexico. A total of 110 branches were involved in the experiment, with 40 branches assigned the PLS treatment and 70 control branches. We demonstrate that PLS products serve as a nudge to open bank accounts and result in a 46% increase in bank account openings. Additionally, those opening accounts due to the lottery are significantly lower savers than their counterparts in the control branches. Furthermore, they keep their accounts open at similar rates and 36 percent use their accounts almost 5 years after the temporary incentive. We do not observe current account holders changing their average savings during the lottery.  Overall, we see effects on long-term savings for those who open accounts due to a short-term lottery incentives. Consequently, these lottery incentive (PLS) products could serve as an effective policy initiative to get individuals to open and learn to use savings accounts.

This grant funded us to obtaindata about those individual accounts opened during the lottery. We were able to show that those opening accounts during the lottery incentives turn out to be lower savers at the start, but over 36 percent of them still actively use their accounts five years later, which is the same rate as those in the control group. Consequently, the short-term lottery incentive has long-term effects for a percentage of people opening accounts.

Photo source: jameskaskade.com

Topics

Capital flows

Initiatives

Financial Globalization

Insider Trading Laws and Innovation

Insider Trading Laws and Innovation

by Ross Levine (Berkeley-Haas), Chen Lin and Lai Wei (CUHK Business School at the Chinese University of Hong Kong)

Link to paper.

Do legal restrictions on insider trading accelerate or slow technological innovation? Theory offers differing answers. Leland (1992) stresses that insider trading quickly reveals their information in public markets, improving stock price informativeness. Thus, restricting insider trading can hinder price discovery and reduce the efficiency of resource allocation among opaque activities such as innovation. Demsetz (1986) argues that for some firms, insider trading is an efficient way to compensate large owners for exerting corporate control. Thus, restricting insider trading can impede effective governance and investment. Other theories, however, highlight mechanisms through which restricting insider trading accelerates innovation. Fishman and Hagerty (1992) and DelMarzo et al. (1998) stress that restricting insider trading reduces the ability of corporate insiders to exploit other investors, which encourages those outside investors to expend resources assessing firms. This improves the valuation of difficult to assess activities, such innovation, and enhances investment.

Existing empirical evidence has not yet resolved these conflicting views. Indeed, researchers have not empirically assessed the overall impact of restricting insider trading on innovation.

In this paper, we offer the first study of whether restrictions on insider trading are associated with an overall increase or decrease in the rate of innovation. To conduct our study, we use the staggered enforcement of insider trading laws across 94 countries over the period from 1976 through 2006. To measure innovation, we construct six patent-based indicators. We obtain information on patenting activities at the industry level in 94 countries from 1976 through 2006 from the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT). We compile a sample of 76,321 country-industry-year observations and calculate the following proxies for technological innovation: (1) the number of patents to gauge the intensity of patenting activity, (2) the number of forward citations to patents filed in this country-industry-year to measure the impact of innovative activity, (3) the number of patents in a country-industry-year that become “top-ten” patents, i.e., patents that fall into the top 10% of citation distribution of all the patents in the same technology class in a year, to measure high-impact inventions, (4) the number of patenting entities to assess the scope of innovative activities, (5) the degree to which technology classes other than the one of the patent cite the patent to measure the generality of the invention, and (6) the degree to which the patent cites innovations in other technology classes to measure the originality of the invention.

We find that enforcing insider trading laws spurs innovation—as measured by patent intensity, scope, impact, generality, and originality. Consistent with theories that insider trading slows innovation by impeding the valuation of innovative activities, the relation between enforcing insider trading laws and innovation is larger in industries that are naturally innovative and opaque, and equity issuances also rise much more in these industries after a country enforces its insider trading laws.

 

Topics

Capital flows

Initiatives

Financial Globalization

Relationships in Over the Counter Markets

Relationships in Over the Counter Markets

by Christine Parlour (Berkeley-Haas)

For a preliminary version of the paper, see here.

The size of over the counter (OTC) markets is enormous. As of April 30, 2015, the BIS estimated that the notional value outstanding of derivative contracts traded OTC to be 20,880 billion USD. Despite the importance of this market to practitioners, regulators and academics some aspects of its organization are not well understood.  This is because, the current paradigm to analyze OTC markets is based on search models. Recently, an empirical literature (focusing on the Municipal Bond market) has established that some OTC markets, when viewed as a network, have a core/periphery structure.  That is, a few dealers perform most of the transactions. These empirical results are inconsistent with search models. The premise of this project is that OTC markets are not search markets, but relationship markets. There will be two steps to this analysis. First, develop and analyze a clean model of customer intermediary interaction. Second, embed this in an industry-wide model in which intermediaries compete for customers.

Photo source: driverlayer.com

Topics

Capital flows

Initiatives

Financial Globalization